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HANGED FOR A SHEEP-THE ECONOMICS OF
MARGINAL DETERRENCE
DAVID FRIEDMAN and WILLIAM SJOSTROM*

"As good be hanged for a sheep as a lamb."'
SUPPOSE the highest punishment imposed in a particular legal system is
life imprisonment. Someone suggests that perpetrators of armed robbery,
a particularly dangerous and unpleasant crime, deserve that punishment.
From the standpoint of traditional legal scholarship, this proposal raises
a variety of issues having to do with the justice of the punishment. From
the standpoint of the economic analysis of law, it raises a much simpler
question: do we want to make it in the interest of armed robbers to kill
their victims?
In thinking about an economically efficient set of criminal punishments,
we usually start by considering a single crime and trying to find the optimal way of inducing potential offenders not to commit it.2 This article is
concerned with a problem one step more complicated-the situation in
which a potential offender, if he commits an offense, will be choosing
among two or more different crimes.' If he commits one crime, he cannot
(or, in more elaborate versions, is less likely to) commit the other. In
such a situation, one of the considerations in setting punishments is the
* University of Chicago Law School and University College, Cork, Ireland. The authors
would like to thank Richard Epstein for bringing them together and Douglas Baird for useful
comments on a previous draft.
I An old English proverb, of unknown origin, first recorded in John Ray, A Collection
of English Proverbs, in the 1678 edition. The proverb was recorded there as "Hanged for
a sheep as a lamb, As good be."
2 See, for instance, the classic discussion in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (March/Apil 1968).
1 Throughout this article, we use "crime" to mean "type of offense" and "offense" to
mean "act of committing a crime." Thus, "sheep stealing" is one crime, "lamb stealing"
is another crime, and "murder" is a third crime. A particular act of sheep stealing, or a
particular murder, is one offense.
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXII (June 1993)]
©1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/93/2202-0005$01.50
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risk that a high punishment for one crime may4 shift the offender to committing a different, and perhaps a worse, one.
This consideration arises in several different, and apparently unrelated,
situations. The most obvious is summed up by the proverb quoted above.
A thief has an opportunity to carry off one animal from the flock. If the
penalty is the same for whichever animal he chooses, he might as well
take the most valuable: "As good be hanged for a sheep as a lamb."
The same logic applies to more modern thefts. If we impose the same

punishment however large the amount stolen, there is no incremental
punishment for taking the tape deck as well as the television.
A second situation is exemplified by the case of the robber killing his

victim. Since the objective of the murder is to keep him from being caught
for robbery, he has no interest in committing only murder; his alternatives
are no crime, robbery, or robbery plus murder. This is similar to the

previous situation if we think of robbery as one crime and robbery plus
murder as another.5
A third example is the distinction between robbery and armed robbery
recognized in existing law. If we have already imposed the highest pun-

ishment we are willing to use for armed robbery, an increase in the punishment for ordinary robbery decreases the probability we will be robbed
but increases the probability we will be robbed by someone carrying a
gun. Some previously unarmed robbers will decide to quit the profession,
but those who do not may find that the added security of carrying a gun

is now worth the (lower) cost.
4 We are not the first writers to consider this issue. Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal
Deterrence, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 345 (1992), cites earlier discussions by Cesare Bonesaria Beccaria, Baron Montesquieu, and Jeremy Bentham. In the modern literature, George
J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, at 527-28 (1970),
offers one of the most commonly cited explanations, that "marginal costs are necessary to
marginal deterrence." The argument is that if the criminal is to be executed for a small
crime, he has no reason not to commit a greater crime. This argument has been widely cited,
for example, by Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14
J. Law & Econ. 201 (1971); Jon D. Harford, Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable
Pollution Standards and Taxes, 5 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 26 (March 1978); Paul H. Rubin,
The Economics of Crime, 28 Atlantic Econ. Rev. 38 (July/August 1978); Donald C. Keenan
& Paul H. Rubin, Criminal Violations and Civil Violations, 11 J. Legal Stud. 365 (1982);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289
(1983); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
652 (1983); David J. Pyle, The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement (1983); Francis
T. Lui, A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence, 31 J. Pub. Econ. 215 (November 1986);
and B. Curtis Eaton & William D. White, The Distribution of Wealth and the Efficiency of
Institutions, 29 Econ. Inquiry 336 (April 1991).
"The severity of punishment of itself emboldens men to commit the very wrongs it is
supposed to prevent; they are driven to commit additional crimes to avoid the punishment
for a single one." Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (Henry Paolucci trans.
Indianapolis 1963) (1st ed. n.p. 1764), at 43.
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These examples can be generalized to a much wider range of situations.
To the extent that different crimes are committed by people with the same
special characteristics, such as a taste for risk, a deficient conscience, or
skill in not being noticed, each of these crimes is a substitute for the
others. A criminal who is mugging someone cannot be simultaneously
burgling someone else's house. So our analysis will be relevant whenever
the same sort of people commit several different sorts of crimes and
choose among them in part on the basis of the expected cost of being
caught and punished.
A fourth application is the distinction between punishing an attempt
and punishing the completed crime.6 In some cases, the difference between an attempt and a crime is merely chance. But in others, the attempt
represents a crime abandoned when it became clear to the offender that
it was more difficult, or more risky, than expected. One consideration in
deciding whether to complete the crime will be the additional punishment
for doing so.
In Section I, we analyze a situation with two alternative crimes; we
assume that the cost function for apprehending offenders is the same for
both. Section II generalizes the analysis of Section I to the case of more
than two alternatives. In Section III, we consider the robber who may
kill his victim in order to reduce the chance of being caught. In such a
situation, it is the cost function for catching the offender, rather than the
benefit the offender receives from his offense, that depends on which
crime he chooses to commit.
Section IV extends the analysis to situations in which different crimes
are substitutes but not strict alternatives. In Section V, we consider how
our conclusions are affected by varying our assumptions about the cost
function for catching and punishing criminals. Section VI discusses the
relation between the predicted pattern of effective punishment and the
predicted pattern of actual punishment and compares our results to others
in the recent literature.
Throughout the discussion, we attempt both to describe a formal solution to the problem of optimal punishment and to answer two questions
about that solution. The first question is how optimal punishment varies
with the damage done: ought the more serious crime always be punished
more severely? The second is how the possibility of one crime affects
6 See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 435
(1990); and David Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for
Attempts, 20 J. Legal Stud. 179 (1991). "The importance of preventing a criminal attempt
authorizes punishment, but as there may be an interval between the attempt and the execution, reservation of greater punishment for the accomplished crime may lead to repentance." Beccaria, supra note 5, at 40.
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the optimal punishment for another: does the presence of sheep that a

thief might steal increase or decrease the optimal punishment for stealing
a lamb?
I.

ONLY

Two

ALTERNATIVE CRIMES

A potential offender can choose to commit no offense, to steal a lamb,

or to steal a sheep. Benefits are defined relative to committing no offense.
The benefit to the offender is BL for lamb theft and Bs for sheep theft. A
population of potential offenders can be characterized by a probability

distribution p(BL, Bs). We assume that the loss of a lamb costs the shepherd a fixed amount of damage DL per offense and the loss of a sheep
costs a fixed amount Ds > DL per offense.

We deter commission of a crime by imposing a punishment (P) with a
probability (p). The cost of catching a fraction p of the offenders is pro-

portional to the number of offenses and is an increasing function of p,
number of offenses held constant; it costs more to catch ten criminals
out of one hundred than to catch five. The cost per offense of punishing

offenses, measured as a percentage of the amount of punishment, increases with the size of the punishment. 7

The first step in constructing an optimal system is to find the least
expensive way of imposing a given amount of deterrence. Consider all
of the probability punishment pairs (pi, Pi) that are equivalent to each
other from the standpoint of the criminal and thus have the same deter-

rent effect.8 Pick the one for which the sum of apprehension cost and
punishment cost is lowest. Repeat for every level of deterrence. You now

have a cost curve for deterrence, showing the cost of imposing any level
of deterrence via the least costly combination of probability and punish7 For a more detailed and technical discussion of these assumptions, see David Friedman,
Reflections on Optimal Punishment or Should the Rich Pay Higher Fines? in Research in
Law and Economics (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., & Victor P. Goldberg eds. 1981). The cost of
punishment includes the cost to the criminal. Thus, a costlessly collected fine has a net
cost of zero since what the criminal loses exactly cancels what the court receives. Execution, ignoring the cost to the state of operating the gallows or electric chair, has a cost
equal to the amount of the punishment; the criminal loses one life and nobody gets one.
Imprisonment has a cost greater than the amount of the punishment; the criminal loses his
freedom and the state must pay for the prison. See also Gordon Tullock & Warren Schwartz,
The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. Legal Stud. 75 (1975); and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Optimal Trade-off between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 880 (1979), for related discussions.
8 If the punishment were a cash fine imposed on a risk-neutral criminal, this would be
the set of probability/punishment pairs with a given expected value-the probability of
paying the fine times amount of fine. More generally, it is the set of pairs with the same
certainty equivalent-a definition that takes account of differing sorts of punishment and
differing attitudes toward risk.
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ment. We call the certainty equivalent of a punishment/probability pair
the effective punishment9 and the per offender cost of imposing itapprehension plus punishment-the enforcement cost.

Increasing the effective punishment requires an increase in probability,
punishment, or both. Since cost rises with either probability or punishment, higher levels of deterrence cost more per offense.' 0 We assume

that apprehension and punishment costs do not depend on the crime-it
is as easy to catch a robber who steals a lamb as one who steals a sheep.

The function C(F) is the cost of imposing on the offender a combination
of punishment and probability equivalent to a certain fine of F.

We assume that there is some limit to the ability of the enforcement
system to deter, some Fmax such that no feasible punishment/probability
pair has a certainty equivalent greater than Fmax. As F approaches Fmax,
enforcement cost approaches infinity. We also assume that there are

some offenders whose benefit from committing at least one of the crimes
is greater than Fmax. Without those assumptions, our model leads to a

simple, implausible, and uninteresting solution in any situation in which
all offenses are inefficient:" impose effective punishments that deter all

offenses. Since no offenses occur there is no damage, hence no damage
cost, no punishments to be imposed, hence no punishment cost, and no
2

criminals to be caught, hence no apprehension or conviction cost.1

Figure 1 shows the positive quadrant of a plane whose dimensions are

BL and B s . The effective punishment for stealing a lamb is FL, for a sheep,
9 We use "effective punishment" as a generalization of the more familiar idea of "expected punishment," one which allows us, without increasing the complexity of the analysis, to drop the assumptions of risk-neutral criminals and punishments defined as dollar
amounts. The analytical device, but not the term, was introduced in Friedman, supra note
7.
" Since higher levels of deterrence also result in fewer offenses, total cost of apprehending and punishing criminals may rise or fall, depending on the relation between the
cost curve for deterrence and the supply curve for offenses.
" An efficient offense would be one for which the benefit to the offender was greater
than the cost to the victim-a driver speeding, for instance, in a situation in which the
value to him of getting where he was going sooner was larger than the cost he imposed, in
additional accident risk, on other drivers. If some offenses are efficient, a system that deters
all offenses, even if it does so costlessly, may not be optimal.
12One can avoid this result in several other ways. One is to assume that there are always
some efficient offenses that we would prefer not to deter. A second is to assume that
criminals differ in how likely they are to be caught and that there are always some so skilled
that nothing we can do will make crime unprofitable for them. A third possibility is to drop
our assumption that enforcement cost is zero if there are no offenses. Under such a model,
we might be able to deter all offenses, but only at the cost of maintaining a standby enforcement system to guarantee that if any offense did occur the offender would be almost certain
to be apprehended and convicted. Section V of this essay explores the implications of such
a model.
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A

B

BL
FIGURE 1

Fs. An offender who chooses to steal a sheep receives a benefit of B s at
a cost of Fs, so his net benefit is B s - F s , and similarly for an offender
who chooses to steal a lamb.
Region A contains values of BL and B s such that a potential offender
will choose not to commit either crime. Region B contains values for
which a potential offender will maximize his net benefit by stealing a
lamb. Region C contains values for which a potential offender maximizes
his net benefit by stealing a sheep. To find total costs and benefits for this
particular pair of effective punishments, we integrate over each region the
costs and benefits from the action taken by offenders in that region
weighted by the density of offenders p(BL, Bs). We have
Net Cost = Damage Cost + Enforcement Cost - Benefit to Offenders:
NC

=

fC({Ds + C(Fs) - Bs}p(BL, Bs)dBLdBs

(1)

+ f{DL + C(FL) - BL}P(BL, Bs)dBLdBS.

If we had explicit functions for C(F), p(BL, Bs), Ds, and DL, we could set
6NC(F*, F*)
8NC(F*, F*)
8FL

5Fs

and solve the two equations for the optimal pair of effective punishments
L
S, F*).
(F*,
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FIGURE

2

QUERY.
Can we prove that the optimal effective punishment for the
more serious offense is at least as great as for the less serious?
Without additional assumptions, the answer is no. Consider Figure 2.
Suppose that regions cx and 3 contain almost all potential offenders, with
many more in ot than in 3. By setting F* and F* as shown, we deter
everyone in ot. Potential offenders in 3 cannot be deterred by any punishment we can impose. We minimize the cost of punishing them by choosing the lowest level of punishment sufficient to deter those in o. 3 By
making the ratio of offenders in cx to offenders in 3 sufficiently high, we
can guarantee that deterring the former is worth the cost of punishing the
latter.
3 Some readers may be disturbed by the idea that criminals who cannot be deterred
should be punished as little as possible so as to minimize punishment costs. Yet this is,
from an economic standpoint, precisely the argument for the insanity defense. Since we
cannot deter insane criminals, there is no point in punishing them. Anything done to them is
justified as treatment or as a way of making future offenses impossible, not as a punishment.
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Is it possible to improve on this result by making the additional punishment for sheep theft high enough so that potential offenders in 03will at
least limit themselves to stealing lambs? No. The highest possible marginal punishment for stealing a sheep instead of a lamb is achieved by
setting FL = 0, F s = F m aX.The dashed diagonal line divides the regions
that then correspond to B and C on Figure 2. Region P lies above the
line, so even with the highest possible difference between the two punishments, offenders in that region will still steal sheep. We might think of
the offenders in region ot as gourmets who strongly prefer the flavor of
lamb to that of sheep. Those in region 13are simply very hungry-and
sheep are bigger than lambs.
Suppose we add an additional assumption: that the crime that imposes
larger costs on the victim also provides larger benefits for the criminal,
so that offenders always prefer, at equal punishments, to commit the
more serious crime. 4 Figure 3 shows that situation; p(BL, Bs) is zero
whenever BL -- Bs. Offenders exist only in the shaded region of the figure.
In this situation, we have the following.
THEOREM.
There exists a pair of punishments (F*, F*) such that F*
-- F* and net cost is at least as low as for any pair of punishments for
which that is not true.
Proof. For any given level of Fs, all levels of FL - Fs produce the

same result: nobody steals lambs, the punishment FL is never applied,
and whether someone steals a sheep depends only on Fs. It follows that,
for any given level of Fs, the net cost with FL = Fs is the same as for
any FL > F s . If a lowest cost pair has FL :s; Fs, then our theorem holds.

If a lowest cost pair has FL > Fs, then there is another pair with the
same value of Fs and with FL = Fs that satisfies the theorem.' 5 Q.E.D.
The argument so far has assumed a continuous density of offenders.
With a finite number of offenders, we can prove a stronger result.
THEOREM.
Assume a finite number of offenders; for each offender i,
BL < Bs. Then there exists a pair of punishments (F*, F*) such that

F* < F* and net cost is at least as low as for any pair of punishments
for which that is not true.
If, for any optimal pair of punishments, at least one offender commits
the lesser crime, and if C(F) is a strictly increasing function of F, then
we may replace "at least as low as" with "lower than" in the conclusion
of the theorem.
14 Such an assumption seems appropriate for many sorts of theft and robbery. The more
valuable the items stolen the greater, ceteris paribus, the loss to the victim and the benefit
to the criminal.
11 A discussion of the assumptions needed for stronger forms of the theorem is included
in a longer version of this article available from the authors.
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FIGURE

3

Proof. Assume the contrary; there exists some pair (F**, F*) for
which F * - F * and net cost is lower than for any pair (FL, F s ) such
that FL < Fs.
Let A be the smallest value of (B' - B') for any offender i. By our
assumptions, A > 0. Set
FL* = Fs* - A/2,

and
=

Fs*.

We now have a pair (F*, F*) such that Fl < F*. The same offenses
occur with (F*, F*) as with (F**, F**), so damage to victims and benefit
to offenders are the same. The level of effective punishment is the same
for one crime and lower for the other, so enforcement costs are either
the same or lower.
If the optimum has at least one offender stealing a lamb, and if C(F) is
strictly increasing in F, then enforcement cost is less for (F*, F*) than
for (Fs*, F*) since F* is lower, and therefore less costly to impose,
than Fl*. Q.E.D.
QUERY. Can we prove that the optimal punishment for the more serious crime is larger than if the lesser crime did not exist-that the optimal
punishment for stealing a sheep is larger than if there were no lambs?
No-it is not true. The same answer holds if we reverse the
ANSWER.
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question and ask whether the optimal punishment for stealing a lamb is
lower than if there were no sheep.
We might expect that eliminating sheep from the flock would permit a
higher punishment for stealing a lamb since we would no longer have to
worry that doing so would cause thieves to steal sheep instead. The
reason this is not always true has to do with punishment costs. Consider
a thief who values both sheep and lambs very highly-so highly that, if
there are sheep in the flock, no feasible punishment/probability combination will deter him from stealing a sheep, and if there are only lambs in
the flock, no combination will keep him from stealing a lamb. Further
suppose that he much prefers stealing sheep; if both are available, he will
choose to steal a sheep, whatever the punishments and probabilities.
If there are both lambs and sheep in the flock, the existence of such a
thief affects the optimal punishment for stealing a sheep. He cannot be
deterred, but he can be punished, and the cost of doing so is one of the
arguments against raising the punishment for stealing sheep. It is not,
however, an argument for or against raising the punishment for stealing
a lamb. As long as there are sheep available, the punishment for lamb
stealing will neither deter him (since he prefers to steal a sheep anyway)
nor have to be imposed on him.
Now suppose the sheep all die; we have only lambs in the flock. The
existence of this thief suddenly becomes a reason to lower the punishment for stealing a lamb. With no sheep available, he is going to steal a
lamb, whatever we do, and the higher the punishment for doing so, the
larger the cost of punishing him. If enough thieves are of this sort, the
optimal punishment for stealing lambs will be lower when there are no
sheep in the flock.
For a geometric version of the argument, consider Figure 2 again. The
thief described above is in region 13. The more thieves are in region 13,
the lower the optimal punishment for stealing a lamb-provided there
are no sheep for them to steal instead.
II.

MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVE CRIMES

So far we have assumed that there are only two alternative crimes; we
now drop that assumption. We continue to assume that the different
crimes are alternatives: an offender has the opportunity to commit only
one offense.
In the previous section, we showed how we could derive two equations
from which the optimal pair of effective punishments could be calculated.
Repeating the analysis for N potential crimes would yield N similar equations in N variables. These equations describe an optimum in which
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slightly increasing any one punishment produces a gain from offenders
substituting to less damaging crimes (including no offense) that just balances the loss from offenders substituting to more damaging crimes plus
the increase (or minus the decrease) in enforcement cost.
In Section I we showed that, without additional assumptions, the effective punishment for the more serious crime might be lower than for the
less serious. Since the situation analyzed there was a special case of the
situation analyzed here, that negative result still applies. Can we also
generalize our positive result?
QUERY. Can one prove that, if benefit to offender has the same ordering as damage to victim, then optimal punishment also has the same
ordering?
ANSWER.

Yes.

We define
D i = damage done by crime i,
F, = effective penalty for crime i, and

Bk = benefit potential offender k will receive if he commits crime i.
We assume a finite number of potential offenders. We also assume
if i > j, then D i > Dj (Condition 1);

if i > j, then B > B for all potential offenders k (Condition 2);
for i > j, let Ai1 be the smallest value of B - B for any offender k.
It follows that there exists some set of effective punishments {F} such
that
if i > j, then Fi > Fj (Condition 3)
and the net cost of crime with {F} is at least as low as under any alternative set of punishments.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a set of punishments
{F**} for which net cost of crime is lower than for any {F} satisfying
condition 3. Since {F**} does not satisfy the condition, there must be
some pair i, j such that
i> j and F** -s F** (Condition 4).

From condition 2, we know that B > B for all potential offenders k,
- F**) > (Bk - Fj**) for all potential offenders k. Every

hence (B
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offender is better off committing crime i than committing crime j, so
nobody commits crime j.
Now replace {F**} with {F*}, where the only change between the two
sets of punishments is that F* = F** - A0-. The net benefit of committing
crime j is still less than the net benefit from committing crime i. Repeat
this for every pair i, j satisfying condition 4. We end up with a set of
penalties that produces at least as good a result as {F**} and satisfies
condition 3. So the assumption that no such set exists leads to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
III.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN ROBBERY AND ROBBERY PLUS MURDER

We now return to the case of the robber deciding whether or not to
kill his victim. His objective in doing so is not a larger benefit but a lower
probability of being caught. We have the following.
For all i, B' = B' : The benefit to any criminal of robbery and of
robbery plus murder is the same.
< D
r,:
..Robbery plus murder imposes a larger cost on the victim
than robbery alone.
For all F > 0, Cr(F) < Crm(F): It is harder to catch robbers who kill
their victims, so the cost of imposing any level of effective punishment
on them is higher.
It follows that Fr
FrmX: The highest effective punishment that it is
possible to impose for robbery is at least as high as for robbery plus
murder.
Our tie-breaking rule is that the offender commits the lesser crime if
net benefit to him is the same for both.
Given these assumptions, the optimal pattern of effective punishment
must have Fr -<Fr,. To see why, suppose the contrary; let the optimal
effective punishments be (F*, Frm), F* > F*m . Consider as an alternative
the pair (Frm, F*n). The number of offenses remains the same, but all
offenders switch from robbery plus murder to simple robbery. The benefit
to the offenders is the same, the cost to the victims is less, and the cost to
the enforcement system is less since we are imposing the same expected
punishment (Frm*) on the same number of offenders as before and it is
cheaper to impose a given expected punishment on an offender who has
not killed his victim: C(F* ) < Crn(F*m). The pair * F*) is a superior
set of punishments to (F*, F*m), so the former cannot have been, as we
assumed, the optimal set. It follows that for the optimal set, Fr - Fr,.6
16 In an efficient combination of probability and punishment, the marginal cost of increasing effective punishment must be the same for both inputs (probability and punishment).
Killing the victim raises the total cost of any probability of apprehension but does not affect
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Increasing the punishment for robbery plus murder above the punishment for robbery has no effect on either the number of offenses (there
are no murders to be deterred) or the cost of enforcement (there are no
murderers to be caught and punished); for simplicity, we set the two
effective punishments equal. If we were taking account of complications
such as imperfect information and criminals who differed in how easy
they were to catch, we would want to make the effective penalty faced
by the average offender for murder plus robbery significantly higher than
for robbery alone, 7 in order to deter atypical robbers from killing their
victims.
To choose the level of effective punishment, we find the value of Fr
that minimizes net cost, subject to the condition that Fr = Fr. < Frmax.
Since nobody is committing robbery plus murder, the relevant costs are
all for simple robbery, and the calculation is the same as if murder were
not possible, except that in that case the constraint would be Fr < Fmx.
If the constraint is not binding-if we do not have a corner solution at
Fmax-the optimal punishment for robbery is the same whether or not
murder is an option. If the constraint is binding, then the possibility of
murder lowers the optimal punishment for robbery.
IV.

DIFFERENT CRIMES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR EACH OTHER

So far, we have considered offenders who choose one out of a set of
alternative crimes-although we have allowed one crime to be a combination such as robbery plus murder. While this may describe the situation
of a robber deciding whether or not to murder his victim, it seems less
appropriate for a thief who may choose to steal a lamb today and a sheep
tomorrow, and still less for a criminal with a mixed career in burglary,
robbery, and extortion.
One possibility for analyzing such situations would be to treat each
possible combination of crimes as a different crime; the offender would
be choosing (and being punished for) a particular criminal career. In practice, courts rarely have complete information about the careers of the
criminals they punish. They do, however, have some information and
can and do use it to make the punishment of one offense depend to some
degree on what other offenses the criminal has committed.
the cost function for punishment. If, as seems plausible, it also raises the marginal cost of
apprehension at any probability, then maintaining the same level of effective punishment
implies a lower probability combined with a higher punishment for the robber who kills his
victim.
17 Strictly speaking, this is the average effective penalty since under these assumptions
the effective penalty may be different for different offenders committing the same crime.
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An alternative approach is to consider different crimes as substitutes
rather than alternatives. If two goods are substitutes, an increase in the
price of one-in this case, the effective punishment for one crimeincreases the demand for the other. This is a more general approach to
marginal deterrence than our earlier assumption that crimes are alternatives, substituting for each other on a strict one-for-one basis.
Why might we expect different crimes to be substitutes for each other?
An offender owns inputs, such as his own labor, used in the production
of offenses. Time spent committing one crime increases his income and
reduces his leisure, making the commission of other crimes less attractive. If the punishment for one crime increases, some offenders will
choose not to commit it, making them more willing to commit other
crimes. If we raise the punishment for robbery while leaving the punishment for burglary unchanged, we expect an increase in the number of
burglaries.
In earlier sections, we considered two questions: "will the more serious crime have a higher effective punishment?" and "what effect does
the possibility of one crime have on the optimal punishment for the
other?" The arguments made there can be restated here in a more general
form.
We minimize the cost associated with a crime by setting effective punishment at the level at which the benefit of raising it a little farther would
be just balanced by the cost. The benefit is due to the reduction in the
number of offenses as a result of the increase and so depends on the
slope of the demand curve. The cost is the cost of imposing a more severe
effective punishment on those not deterred, which depends on how many
of them there are-the quantity demanded. 8 So the optimal effective
punishment depends on the shape of the demand curve, which determines
the relation between level of demand (quantity demanded at a price) and
slope (how fast the quantity demanded changes with changes in price).
The assumption that two crimes are substitutes tells us how the demand
for one changes when the price of the other is changed, but it does not
give us a relation between the shapes of the two curves, so it does not
tell us which crime should have the higher effective punishment.
Can we predict how the optimal effective punishment for one crime
will depend on the possibility of the other? Figure 4a shows two demand
curves for stealing lambs. Each shows quantity stolen as a function of
8 In addition, there are costs and benefits associated with the effect of a change in the
effective punishment for one crime on the rate of commission of the other. Our definition
of crimes being substitutes requires that such effects exist but permits no lower bound to
be set to their size, so in demonstrating the existence of a possibility (in this case, the
possibility that the more serious offense might have the lower optimal punishment), we can
assume that they are too small to change the conclusion of our analysis.
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the price-the effective punishment. The line DLS is the demand curve if
both lambs and sheep are available to be stolen, DL the demand curve if
there are only lambs. The line DL is to the right of DLs because the two
crimes are substitutes; eliminating one is equivalent to raising its price
to infinity, and so increases demand for the other.
In setting an optimal level of effective punishment, we are trading off
the benefit of deterring additional offenses against the cost of punishing
those offenses we do not deter. At any particular level of effective punishment, such as F ° on Figure 4a, the cost of slightly increasing the punishment is proportional to the number of offenses occurring-the quantity
demanded at that price. The benefit is proportional to the inverse slope
of the demand curve-the rate at which number of offenses decreases
as effective punishment increases. The benefit also depends on whether
deterring a thief from stealing a lamb means that he steals nothing or
steals a sheep instead.
In Figure 4a, DL is twice DLS; at any level of effective punishment,
twice as many lambs are stolen if there are no sheep in the flock to steal
instead. In that situation, the slope of D and the quantity demanded at
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any price increase by the same factor, leaving the balance between cost
and benefit unchanged. If that were the only effect of eliminating sheep
from the flock, the optimal punishment would be the same before and
after the change.
But it is not the only effect. Eliminating sheep also increases the benefit
associated with deterring thieves from stealing lambs since it eliminates
the problem of deterring them into stealing sheep instead. So if, at some
optimal effective punishment F*s, the benefit from further increasing the
punishment for stealing a lamb just balanced the cost when both sheep
and lambs were in the flock, then eliminating the sheep while keeping the
effective punishment for stealing lambs the same would make the benefit
of increasing the effective punishment larger than the cost, so the optimal
effective punishment in that situation, F*, would be greater than F*s.
All of this depends on the assumption, implicit in Figure 4a, that the
slope and the value of D changed by the same factor when we shifted
from DLS to DL. If the inverse of the slope of D at F*s increased by a
larger factor than the value of D, as it does at F on Figure 4b, the
argument holds a fortiori.
But if the inverse slope increases less than the value, as on Figure 4c,
the argument no longer holds. In that situation, the elimination of sheep
from the flock increases the number of thieves who must be punished for
stealing lambs (at a given level of effective punishment F* ) by more than
it increases the number who will be deterred by a small increase in the
effective punishment. If that effect is strong enough, it can outweigh the
increase in the benefit from deterring thieves due to the elimination of
sheep that the thieves might steal instead. We then end up with F* less
than F*s. Without some further assumption about how the slope of the
demand curve for the one crime changes with the price of the other, we
cannot show that the possibility of the more serious crime necessarily
lowers the optimal punishment for the less serious.
Two effects are associated with the elimination of sheep from the flock.
One, the increased benefit of deterrence, moves the optimal punishment
for stealing lambs in an unambiguous direction-up. The other, the possible change in the ratio between the slope and the value of demand, could
go either way. With one effect that increases the optimal punishment and
another that might equally well increase it or decrease it, we may perhaps
say that we have a weak presumption for a net increase.
V.

DIFFERENT COST FUNCTIONS

Throughout this article, we have assumed that the cost of imposing a
given probability of apprehension is proportional to the number of offenders-that it costs twice as much to apprehend twenty offenders out of
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two hundred as it does to apprehend ten out of a hundred. Steven Shavell,
in his recent paper on marginal deterrence, 19 makes a very different assumption. His cost function is independent of the number of offenses. It
costs more to apprehend twenty criminals out of a hundred than ten out
of a hundred, but it costs the same amount to apprehend twenty out of
a hundred as two hundred out of a thousand.
While one can imagine a technology of apprehension with these characteristics-cameras on every street corner, perhaps, taking photographs
at random intervals-it seems implausible. It would not be surprising,
however, to find less extreme economies (or diseconomies) of scale in
the production function for apprehensions. It is therefore worth asking
how our results would be affected if we generalized our cost function.
Instead of assuming that
TC(F, 0) = 0 x C(F),

where TC(F) is the total cost of imposing an expected punishment of F
on each of 0 offenders, and C(F), as before, is the cost per offender of
imposing an expected punishment of F, we write
TC(F, 0):

-T-F,>0;
BF

->TC(F,
0.
60

What can we say about the effect of this generalization of the cost
function on our results?
Our negative results are unaffected. The model we have been using is
a special case of the more general model, so a counterexample under the
former is a counterexample under the latter as well. There remains the
question of which of our positive results hold in the more general case.
Consider the case of the robber who might kill. One element in our
argument was that, by keeping the effective punishment for that crime
above the effective punishment for simple robbery, we could reduce the
number of such killings to zero, saving both the lives of the victims and
the extra cost of catching (or punishing more severely) robbers who had
eliminated the witnesses to their offenses. If enforcement cost does not
go to zero with the number of offenses, things are not quite so simple.
Our conclusion, however, still stands.2" Any schedule of punishments
in which the effective punishment is lower for the robber who kills his
victim is dominated by one with the same effective punishment for that
supra note 4.
Our result, and our argument, are similar to those in Louis Wilde, Criminal Choice,
Nonmonetary Sanctions and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis, 12 Int'l Rev. L.
& Econ. 345 (1992); and Jennifer Reinganum & Louis Wilde, Nondeterrables and Marginal
Deterrence Cannot Explain Nontrivial Sanctions (unpublished manuscript, California Inst.
Tech. 1986).
19 Shavell,

20
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case and with the effective punishment for robbers who do not kill their
victims lowered to the point where the robbers just find it in their interest
to switch to the less violent strategy. The only change is that, instead of
concluding that the effective punishment for the robber who kills his
victim should be at least as great as for the robber who does not, we now
conclude that the two should be equal,21 since an increase in the effective
punishment for the more serious crime above that necessary to deter it
may be costly even if no offenses occur.
Our other conclusion was that the optimal punishment for robbery was
unaffected by the possibility that the robber might kill his victim, except
in the case of a corner solution, where the optimal effective punishment
for robbery alone was above the maximum feasible punishment for a
robber who killed his victim. That conclusion no longer holds under the
more general cost function. The cost of any level of effective punishment
for robbery now includes the standby cost necessary to impose that same
effective punishment on the (more difficult to apprehend) crime of robbery plus murder. So the marginal cost of increasing the effective punishment for robbery is higher if it is possible for robbers to kill their victims,
leading to a lower optimal effective punishment.
The other positive result we got was that punishment should increase
with severity in the models of Sections I and II, provided that the more
serious crime also provided a larger benefit to the offender, as in the case
of stealing more or more valuable objects. The proof of that result did
not depend on the details of the cost function, so it still holds.
VI.

PUNISHMENT AND EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT

In analyzing the implications of marginal deterrence for optimal punishment, we have concentrated on questions involving the effective punishment for a crime-the certainty equivalent of the combination of probability and actual punishment imposed on those who commit it. Previous
authors 22 have asked our first question with regard to actual rather than
effective punishment: is the optimal actual punishment higher for the
21 This result depends on our tie-breaking rule, which is somewhat artificial, and on the
general tidiness of the model compared to the real world. The more realistic point is that,
once we include a standby cost, we have an incentive to keep down the effective punishment
for the more severe crime since a higher effective punishment is costly even if it never has
to be imposed.
22 Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 20; Wilde, supra note 20; and Shavell, supra note 4.
All three investigate the question of whether the optimal punishment rises with the seriousness of the offense. Shavell also touches briefly on the question of how the possibility
of committing one offense changes the optimal punishment for the other.
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more severe of two alternative crimes? What can we say about the relation between that question and the one we have been answering; if the
effective punishment for one crime is higher than for another, does that
imply that the actual punishment is also higher?
In the most general case, the answer is no. In picking a particular
combination of probability and punishment, we look for one that provides
a given effective punishment at the lowest cost. If the cost functions for
catching offenders are different for different crimes, then the efficient
probability/punishment combinations will be different as well. If, for example, the more serious crime happened to be much easier to detect, we
might want to punish it with a high probability of a moderate punishment,
while punishing the less serious crime with a much lower probability of
a somewhat higher punishment. The result would be a higher effective
punishment for the more serious crime but a lower actual punishment.
This is a pattern that we sometimes observe. Double parking in a busy
street probably does more damage than throwing a paper napkin out of
a car window-but the fine for littering may well be higher than the fine
for double parking, reflecting the fact that only a very small fraction of
litterers are caught. We do not know of any similar cases involving crimes
that, like those we have been discussing, are alternatives or substitutes.
We can, however, suggest a hypothetical one.
A town bans the burning of leaves. Homeowners face three alternatives. They can pay to have their leaves hauled away. They can burn
them and risk a fine. Or they can put their leaves in trash bags and dump
the bags on someone else's property when nobody is watching. Burning
the leaves does the most damage but is much easier to detect than dumping. The optimal pattern of punishments will probably impose a higher
expected punishment for burning but a higher actual punishment for
dumping.
As this example suggests, the result that previous authors have looked
for-higher optimal punishments for more serious offenses-cannot in
general be established because it is not in general true. In order to get it,
we require additional assumptions. The main one is that the cost function
for catching and convicting offenders is the same for all of the alternative
offenses being considered. In addition, we assume increasing marginal
cost for both catching and punishing criminals. These latter assumptions
imply that the least costly way of increasing effective punishment is by
increasing both probability and punishment. It follows that, if the more
serious crime has the higher effective punishment, it will also have the
higher actual punishment.
The difference between our emphasis on effective punishment and the
emphasis in the previous literature on actual punishment is both a cause
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and a consequence of important differences in assumptions. In Shavell, 23
punishment cost is assumed to be zero; in Wilde24 and in Reinganum and
Wilde25 it is proportional to the size of the punishment. Under either set
of assumptions, a situation in which punishment is below its maximum
feasible level can always be improved by raising the punishment and
lowering the probability of inflicting it, keeping expected punishment constant. It follows that the optimal punishment for a single offense is always
the highest feasible. With multiple offenses, one would expect marginal
deterrence to be provided by imposing the same (maximal) punishment
on all offenses and varying the enforcement effort so as to catch a smaller
fraction of offenders for less serious offenses.
In order to avoid this result,26 all three papers assume that apprehension for different offenses is ajoint product of a single enforcement effort.
The probabilities of apprehension for two alternative offenses are determined by the same decision, so the only way of changing the expected
punishment for one without changing the expected punishment for the
other is by altering the punishment. One offense receives the maximal
punishment, the other a lower punishment. Additional assumptions are
needed to make sure that it is the more serious offense that receives the
higher punishment.
These papers thus introduce an artificial assumption about enforcement
costs in order to eliminate a problem created by an artificial assumption
about punishment costs. The problem does not arise with our more realistic model. Once you allow the ratio of punishment cost to punishment to
increase with the size of the punishment, problems associated with always imposing the highest feasible punishment disappear since even if
there is a highest feasible punishment, there is no reason to expect it to
be optimal.
In addition to avoiding some of the artificial assumptions of the earlier
papers,27 we also generalize the analysis to a wider range of problems23 Shavell, supra note 4.
24 Wilde, supra note 20.
25

Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 20.

"By now it should be clear what is needed to get a theory of nontrivial sanctions . .. :a link between probabilities of apprehension for different crimes." Reinganum
& Wilde, supra note 20, at 8.
"For optimal sanctions to be different for the two acts, enforcement effort cannot be
specific to the act. Suppose instead that enforcement effort is of a general nature, affecting
in the same way the probability of apprehension for committing different harmful acts;
therefore, assume the probability of apprehension for committing act I equals that for
committing act 2." Shavell, supra note 4, at 3.
27 Both the assumptions discussed here and Shavell's assumption, discussed in Section
V above, that the cost of catching a given fraction of offenders is unaffected by the number
26

of offenses.
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more than two crimes and crimes that are substitutes but not alternatives.28 In addition to the question of relative punishments, we also consider the effect of the possibility of one crime on the punishment for the
other. And we discuss explicitly, in Section V, the effect of differing
assumptions about the form of the cost function for catching and punishing offenders.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We have been analyzing optimal punishment in situations in which one
crime is a substitute for another. The obvious intuition is that we should
keep the punishment for the less serious crime down so as not to tempt
offenders to switch to the more serious. It is that intuition, seen from the
standpoint of the thief rather than the lawmaker, that is behind the proverb with which we started our discussion.
The economics are less clear than the intuition. The benefit of deterring
a thief from stealing a lamb is less when the result may be that he steals
a sheep instead, which is an argument for a lower punishment. But the
existence of sheep to be stolen may, by reducing the number of thieves
who steal lambs, reduce the cost of catching and punishing them, which
lowers the cost of imposing any particular level of effective punishment
and raises the optimal punishment. When we add in the distinction between the number of thieves on the margin and in total and note that
including sheep in the flock may affect the two numbers in different ways,
the situation becomes complicated enough to make a purely verbal analysis difficult. The result of a more formal treatment turns out to be ambiguous. While there is some presumption that the possibility of the more
serious crime will lower the optimal penalty for the less serious, the
opposite effect is possible.
Whether the more serious crime should have the more severe effective
punishment is also less clear in the analysis than in the intuition. The
answer is "yes" if the offender's only objective in committing the more
serious crime is to make it harder to catch him. It is also "yes" if crimes
are alternatives and the benefit to the criminal is always larger for the
more serious crime. Thus, our analysis does imply that a thief should
be punished more severely the greater the value of what he chooses to
28 Shavell briefly mentions the applicability of the analysis to the case of multiple acts
(our Section II); he does not discuss the case in which offenses are substitutes (our Section
IV). His comment on the issue of punishment costs is, "In the case where sanctions are
nonmonetary, I have not succeeded in obtaining an appealing characterization of the difference between the one-act and the two-act models, although one supposes that in some
general sense the results should be similar to those discussed here." Shavell, supra note
4, at 10.
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steal-that there should be some incremental punishment for taking the
tape deck as well as the television.29
Our analysis does not, however, imply that punishment should rise
with severity in the general case. Where a criminal is choosing between
two alternative crimes but where some criminals may prefer (punishment
aside) the less serious of the two, the optimal schedule of punishments
might punish the less serious crime more severely, as we showed in
Section 1. Where two crimes are substitutes but not alternatives, there is
no necessary relation between their punishments. And even if effective
punishment does increase with severity, that implies that actual punishment increases with severity only if the difficulty of catching an offender
is independent of his offense.
29 To a considerable extent, that relation exists explicitly in present law. Even where it
does not, it seems likely that police effort in catching thieves increases, on average, with
the amount stolen.
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